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Abstract
A characteristic of the news market is that consumers often cross-check in-
formation, i.e. observe several news outlets. At the same time, data on politi-
cal media suggest that more partisan consumers are more likely to cross-check.
We explore these phenomena by building a model of horizontal competition in
newspaper endorsements. Without cross-checking, outlets are unbiased and mini-
mally differentiated. When cross-checking is allowed, we show that cross-checkers
are indeed more partisan than those who only acquire one report. Furthermore,
cross-checking induces outlets to differentiate, and the degree of differentiation
is increasing in the dispersion of consumer beliefs. Differentiation is detrimental
to consumer welfare, and a single monopoly outlet may provide higher consumer
welfare than a competitive duopoly.
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1. INTRODUCTION
News is normally consumed multiple times throughout the day and from various
sources. Apart from the entertainment aspect, media consumers cross-check news (ob-
serve various news outlets) to learn omitted information and to be exposed to different
points of view. One of the stylized facts of media markets is that people prefer news
sources that share their political bias,1 but cross-checking often involves sources of dif-
ferent partisanship. For instance, according to Pew Research Center’s “2012 Media
Consumption Survey”, of the people who regularly read either the New York Times or
the Wall Street Journal, 18 percent regularly read both, and of the people who regu-
larly watch Fox News, 28 percent also regularly watch CNN or MSNBC. Furthermore,
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) show that visitors to Internet sites with “extreme” politi-
cal bias have a higher than average propensity to visit sites that are of the opposite bias.
Cross-checking thus challenges stylized views of news consumption, yet no analysis exists
of how it affects media bias.2 To address this question, we develop a model of horizontal
competition in newspaper endorsements, and show that cross-checking augments media
bias to the detriment of consumers.
In our model, consumers face a choice between two options, for instance which polit-
ical candidate to vote for, and get utility from choosing the correct one.3 News outlets
have noisy private information, and publish a report that endorses one of the two op-
tions. Their profits are proportional to their demand. An outlet must choose how much
information it requires to endorse one option over the other, and this choice is inter-
preted as media bias. Bias is therefore not associated with lying, but rather with the
weighting of evidence. Consumers are heterogeneous in their prior about which option
is correct, and we associate this prior with partisanship. Because the informativeness of
a report is decreasing with the distance between outlet and consumer bias, the model
1. See for instance Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) or Puglisi and Snyder (2011).
2. Previous work has either focused on advertising (Anderson et al. (2011); Ambrus et al. (2012))
or quality and pricing (Anderson et al. (2010)).
3. Note that although we use the example of voters, this is not a voting model. Consumer utility
depends only on choosing the correct option, and not on how many choose it.
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has a spatial dimension akin to the Hotelling model.4
We consider two cases. When cross-checking is sequential, consumers can read the
reports already acquired before deciding whether to continue acquisition. This can be
thought of as online news or television, where the cost of switching from one outlet to
another is very low. When cross-checking is simultaneous, reports can only be acquired
at a given time, and therefore the acquisition decision must be taken prior to reading
any report. This is an approximation to the newspaper market, where consumers often
subscribe, and therefore pre-commit, or must decide how many papers to buy in the
morning, knowing that buying the paper later will be more difficult.
First, consumer behavior is analyzed. In line with the aforementioned data, we show
that cross-checkers are often more partisan than consumers who acquire only one report.
The reason for this is that moderates have the weakest priors, and therefore they are
more susceptible to any new information they receive. Thus, a moderate will almost
always become more confident after observing a report, and may not want to acquire
more information. A partisan consumer, on the other hand, gains confidence when his
prior is confirmed, but loses confidence when his prior is contradicted. In the latter case,
he wants to acquire more information to cross-check the first information.
Second, we look at market outcomes. The main result is that cross-checking leads
to more media bias, and in particular we show that (i) in the benchmark case, where
at most one report can be acquired, outlets are unbiased and minimally differentiated;5
(ii) when cross-checking is allowed, outlets may be biased and differentiated. To see the
intuition for this, consider the benchmark case. When outlets increase their bias, they
gain partisan consumers, but lose moderate consumers. However, partisans are hard to
attract since they are very confident in their prior, and therefore increasing bias leads to a
net loss of demand. As a result, outlets prefer to compete for the moderate consumers.
Consider then the cross-checking case. Increasing bias still entails a gain of partisan
consumers, but now it need not imply a loss of moderate consumers, since it is possible
4. However, the horizontal structure is derived from the primitives of the model, and does not
resemble any standard type of Hotelling.
5. By unbiased, we mean that they require the same amount of information to endorse either option,
and by minimally differentiated, we mean that they choose the same bias.
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that they cross-check. Therefore, cross-checking “softens” competition. This effect is
stronger in the simultaneous case than in the sequential case. The reason is that cross-
checkers are more fickle when they can condition acquisition on previous information,
than when they must decide a priori. We therefore expect more differentiation when
cross-checking is simultaneous than when it is sequential. This is in line with Gentzkow
and Shapiro (2011), who show that the ideological segregation of national newspapers
is greater than that of cable news and the Internet in the United States.
Third, we analyze welfare and compare different competition structures. We find
that differentiation increases outlet profits, but is detrimental to consumer welfare. In
some cases, outlets differentiate so much that they become virtually uninformative,
and consumer welfare approaches the no-information level. We then compare duopoly
competition to other market structures, and find that if the outlets have a joint owner,
they are always at least as biased and differentiated as the competitive duopolists. A
single monopoly outlet, on the other hand, is unbiased, which implies that consumer
welfare may be higher under monopoly than under duopoly. In conclusion, although
cross-checking improves consumer welfare if we hold media bias constant, it may also
soften competition so much that it defeats its purpose and leads to lower welfare in
equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and establishes the
benchmark case where at most one report can be acquired. Section 3 analyzes consumer
behavior. Section 4 derives the market outcome and looks at media bias. Section 5
analyzes monopoly and joint ownership, derives welfare implications and considers a
different profit structure. Section 6 concludes. Appendices A and B contain extra
details from the analysis of consumer behavior. All proofs are relegated to Appendix C.
1.1. Related Literature
The literature on news markets is often divided into two strands: supply-driven
bias and demand-driven bias (see Gentzkow and Shapiro (2008) for a comprehensive
review). This paper pertains to the latter. In models of supply-driven bias, competition
often diminishes market bias since “hiding” information becomes more difficult the more
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competitors exist (e.g. Milgrom and Roberts (1986); Baron (2006); Besley and Prat
(2006)). In models of demand-driven bias, consumers demand slant and therefore it is
not clear that competition will reduce bias. The literature has largely focused on models
where consumers observe at most a single outlet (e.g. Chan and Suen (2008); Sobbrio
(2011); Germano and Meier (2012)), and it is found that competition often augments
bias.
The main difference between our paper and the existing literature on cross-checking,
is that we focus on horizontal competition. Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) analyze
a Hotelling model without cross-checking, but consider how the news reports could be
combined ex-post by a cross-checker. Thus, they do not model how cross-checking af-
fects the supply of media bias, which is the focus of our paper. Furthermore, in their
model, a news story consists of a string of verifiable bits, and slanting is done by omitting
specific bits. A cross-checker can then “piece together” the correct news by comparing
reports. This technology is very different to ours, where outlets have independent data
and reports cannot be combined to retrieve the original information. In Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2006), consumers are assumed to always cross-check. Outlets try to gain a
reputation for being high quality and may “garble” their reports to achieve this. Our
paper, in contrast, analyzes horizontal competition and endogenizes consumers’ infor-
mation acquisition. Anderson et al. (2010) analyze cross-checking in a model where
consumers have an intrinsic preference for slant, and outlets are horizontally and ver-
tically differentiated. However, horizontal differentiation is exogenous in their model,
whereas we look at horizontal competition between outlets. Anderson et al. (2011) and
Ambrus et al. (2012) analyze cross-checking and advertising, and show that exclusive
consumers are more attractive to outlets. The reason is that advertisers pay to access
consumers, and whereas an exclusive consumer can be charged at the monopoly price,
outlets compete to sell access to cross-checkers. In neither of these models do outlets
compete horizontally.
The horizontal dimension of our paper can be related to Mullainathan and Shleifer
(2005) and Anderson et al. (2010), who analyze pure Hotelling models in which con-
sumers have a preference for slant. Anderson et al. (2010) assume linear transport costs,
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but, as mentioned above, do not allow for horizontal competition. Mullainathan and
Shleifer (2005) assume quadratic transport costs, which is known to lead to horizontal
differentiation. In our paper, we derive the transport costs and reservation utilities from
the primitives rather than assuming a particular functional form. Our setup is most re-
lated to Chan and Suen (2008), who also derive a horizontal competition structure from
the primitives of their model. However, our paper differs from theirs in two ways. First,
we consider cross-checking, whereas in their paper at most one report is acquired. Sec-
ond, we assume that consumers are heterogeneous in priors, whereas their consumers are
heterogeneous in preferences, and the resulting spatial competition structures are very
different. In particular, heterogeneous priors affect the reservation utility of consumers
whereas heterogeneous preferences (in Chan and Suen’s formulation) do not.
2. A MEDIA MARKET
In this section we present a model of a media market. Although we will keep the
language general, it is perhaps easiest to think of it as a model of newspaper endorse-
ments and “expressive voting”. Newspapers have private information about the quality
of two political candidates and endorse one of them. Readers all vote, and get a positive
payoff if they vote for the correct candidate, regardless of whether he is elected. We
first present the model, and then analyze the benchmark case where cross-checking is
not allowed.
2.1. The Model
There is an unobserved binary state of the world, θ ∈ {L,R}, and a continuum of
readers6. Each reader chooses an action y ∈ {L,R}, which yields payoff u(y, θ) equal
to one if y = θ and zero otherwise. We let p denote the prior probability assigned by
readers to the true state being R, and assume that p is uniformly distributed on [δ, 1−δ],
where δ ∈ (0, 1/2). Thus, readers are heterogeneous in their beliefs and we refer to the
6. We refer to “consumers” as readers to use a word that can both be used to describe newspaper
and online consumers, but the conclusions are equally applicable to other media.
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prior as the type of the reader.
Before taking their action, readers may acquire information about θ through the
media. There are two news outlets, indexed by n ∈ {1, 2}. Outlets assign equal prior
probability to the states, and receive private information about θ in the form of a
signal, xn ∈ [0, 1]. Signals are drawn independently across n from the distribution Fθ,
with density function
fθ(x) ≡
{
2(1− x) if θ = L,
2x if θ = R.
Hence, outlets conduct independent investigations, but the results are correlated through
the true state of the world. After observing xn, outlet n costlessly produces a report
rn ∈ {L,R} that endorses one of the actions. Apart from simplifying the model, we
focus on endorsements because of their empirical relevance (endorsements of political
candidates, stocks, consumer products, etc.).
Readers can acquire reports at cost c, such that if they acquire k reports, their
final utility is u(y, θ) − kc. For the moment we make no assumptions on c, but later
we simplify the analysis by assuming that it is “small”, in a sense that we will make
clear. For each outlet n, we let Πn(a1, a2) denote expected profits and Dn(a1, a2) denote
expected demand. Outlet profits are assumed to be proportional to demand, such that
Πn(a1, a2) = Dn(a1, a2).
The profit function corresponds to a situation in which revenues are derived from ad-
vertising and are proportional to the number of readers.7 In Section 5.3 we extend the
model to allow for different revenues from single-readers and cross-checkers.
The timing of the game is as follows.
t=0: Outlets choose their strategy, observe their signal and prepare reports.
t=1,2: Reports are acquired and read.
7. Similar assumptions on news outlet profits are made in Chan and Suen (2008) and Gentzkow and
Shapiro (2006), whereas Baron (2006) and Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) model price competition.
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t=3: Readers choose their action and realize their payoff.
Notice that information has no instrumental value to readers: they only acquire reports
in order to make better decisions. Therefore, if a report is not sufficiently informative to
influence the reader’s action, it should not be acquired. If a reader is indifferent between
two reports, we assume that he acquires either one with equal probability.
Outlet Strategy. Since reports take the form of endorsements, a reporting strategy
ρn : [0, 1]→ {L,R} is completely characterized by a cut-off an, such that for n = 1, 2
ρn(xn) =
{
L if xn < an,
R if xn ≥ an.
We can interpret an as outlet n’s bias, in the sense that as an increases, outlet n requires
stronger evidence to report R, but less strong evidence to report L. Therefore, we say
that the higher (resp. lower) an is, the more biased outlet n is toward L (resp. R).
From now on we use an to refer to reporting strategies. Furthermore, we use ρn to refer
to the random variable generated by the reporting strategy and the signal, and rn to
refer to a specific realization of this variable, i.e. rn = ρn(xn).
Reader Strategy. The reader chooses an acquisition strategy, σp ≡ (σ1p, σ2p), where
σtp specifies the report acquired in stage t. We consider two cases. In the simultaneous
case, reading can only take place after all reports have been acquired. In the sequential
case, a reader can read the first report he acquires before he decides whether to acquire
the second report. We can formalize this as follows. Let ∅ denote the event that no
report is acquired, and write H1 ≡ {∅} and H2 ≡ {∅, L,R} for the possible histories at
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t = 1, 2. Then8
Simultaneous case: σtp : H
1 → {∅, ρ1, ρ2}.
Sequential case: σtp : H
t → {∅, ρ1, ρ2}.
We will be analyzing subgame-perfect equilibria, and therefore it is convenient to work
directly with the optimal action strategy. Let pip(r) be a type-p reader’s posterior after
observing r ⊂ {r1, r2}, and let Ep[·] be his expectations operator. The optimal action
yp(r) maximizes Ep[u(y, θ)|r]. Then
yp(r) =
{
R if pip(r) ≥ 1/2,
L if pip(r) < 1/2.
Since the posterior is always defined, yp(·) is always defined. Conditional on the optimal
action strategy and on an acquisition strategy σ, both the action taken and (in the
sequential case) the number of reports acquired depend on the signals, and can therefore
be seen as random variables. We denote these by yp(σ) and kp(σ), respectively.
Equilibrium. Recall that reporting strategies are defined entirely by their cut-off
and we have assumed that actions are always chosen optimally. Then the strategies
(σ∗p, a
∗
n), p ∈ [δ, 1− δ], n = 1, 2, constitute a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium if
• For each p, σ∗p maximizes Ep[u(yp(σ), θ)− kp(σ)c] with respect to σ, given a∗n.
• For each n = 1, 2, a∗n maximizes Πn(an, a∗m) with respect to an, given σ∗p.
• Readers’ beliefs about θ are updated using Bayes’ rule, whenever possible.9
Let the set of equilibrium cut-offs (a∗1, a
∗
2) be denoted A and suppose without loss of
generality that a∗1 ≤ a∗2. Before beginning the analysis, we introduce the following
8. We use ρn in the image of the acquisition strategy function, since, ex ante, the reports are random
variables from the point of view of the reader.
9. Since we have restricted the reporting strategy of the outlets, there are no “out-of-equilibrium”
messages and Bayes’ rule always applies.
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taxonomy. We say that the outlet whose cut-off is closest to either zero or one is the
most biased outlet. If a reader does not expect to acquire any reports, we refer to
him as uninformed ; if he expects to acquire exactly one report, we refer to him as a
single-reader ; and if he expects to acquire more than one report, we refer to him as a
cross-checker. Loosely speaking, we will refer to readers with prior close to zero or one
as partisans and readers with prior close to a half as moderates. Lastly, we will use the
notational convention that m 6= n, such that n and m refer to different outlets.
2.2. A Benchmark: Single-Reader Equilibrium
To understand how the model works in the absence of cross-checking, we first restrict
readers to acquiring at most one report. Apart from establishing a benchmark, this also
illustrates how the horizontal competition of the model works. Let a1 ≤ a2 and assume
that 0 < c < 1/4 to avoid uninteresting equilibrium multiplicity.
Suppose first that the consumer does not acquire any report, and denote by Vp ≡
Ep[u(yp(∅), θ)] the no-information payoff. In this case, the posterior equals the prior,
and therefore yp(∅) is R if p is greater than a half and L otherwise. Then
Vp =
{
p if p ≥ 1/2,
1− p otherwise.
Thus, before learning any information, partisans have higher expected utility than mod-
erates, since they are more convinced that they know the true state. This implies that
readers are heterogeneous in their reservation utility. The dotted line in Figure I il-
lustrates this. Suppose now that the reader acquires outlet n’s report. Since the re-
port is always informative, either yp(rn) = rn or yp(rn) = yp(∅) for all rn. Denote by
Vp(an) ≡ Ep[u(yp(ρn), θ)] the reader’s expected payoff from acquiring outlet n’s report.
Then
Vp(a) = max{p(1− a2) + (1− p)(2a− a2), Vp}.
The first term inside the brackets is the expected payoff from following the report, which
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Figure I:
Reader Expected Payoff In the Benchmark Case
0 1
1
1
2
p
φl φu
Vp
Vp(
1
3
)
is just the probability that the report is correct. The second term is the no-information
payoff, which acts as a lower bound, since the reader can always ignore the report. This
is represented by the solid line in Figure I. Maximizing the expected payoff with respect
to a, we find that the optimal outlet type for a type-p reader is a∗(p) = 1−p. Therefore,
readers prefer media that are biased in the same direction as themselves,10 but they do
so because they believe that these outlets are more informative.
Acquiring ρn is preferred to not acquiring any report if Vp(an)− c > Vp. Solving for
p, we obtain an interval (φnl , φ
n
u) with
φnu =
2− an
2
− c
2an
,
φnl =
1− an
2
+
c
2(1− an) .
This interval indicates the potential readers of outlet n’s report. The actual readers
will be the potential readers who prefer outlet n over outlet m, i.e. the types for which
Vp(an) > Vp(am). Since a1 ≤ a2 and Vp(·) is monotone in p, there exists a threshold φ¯
such that outlet 1 is preferred for p > φ¯ and outlet 2 preferred for p < φ¯. The threshold
10. Recall that high values of a are associated with bias toward L, and vice versa.
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is found to be
φ¯ = 1− a1 + a2
2
.
Outlet 1’s market is then going to be all the types above φ¯ but below φ1u, whereas outlet
2’s market is the types below φ¯ and above φ2l . When an outlet moves toward the center
it loses partisan readers, but “steals” moderate readers from the other outlet. Taking
derivatives of the thresholds, we notice that the rate at which the outlet steals moderates
is always greater than the rate at which it loses partisans. The reason is that it is harder
to attract partisans, since they gain less from acquiring information (see Figure I). This
effect drives the first result.
Proposition 1 When readers can acquire at most one report, there exists a unique
equilibrium with
A = (1/2, 1/2).
Both duopolists place themselves at the center, which we refer to as a centrist equilib-
rium. This looks like the classic Hotelling equilibrium with minimum differentiation,
but the mechanism behind it is different. Eaton and Lipsey (1975) demonstrate that
in Hotelling’s formulation, the minimum differentiation result depends on a variety of
factors, including inelastic demand and linear transport costs, and d’Aspremont et al.
(1979) show that when transportation costs are quadratic, there is a tendency for outlets
to maximize differentiation. We have elastic demand and Vp(a) is quadratic in a, which
would suggest that outlets have an incentive to separate. However, minimum differenti-
ation ensues in our model because partisan readers have higher reservation utility, and
are therefore harder to attract.
3. READERS
We begin the main analysis by investigating the demand side of the market. We
proceed backward by first identifying the optimal action function, and then establishing
the optimal acquisition strategy. As stated earlier, we want to analyze market outcomes
when costs are small. Our interest is in analyzing the incentives to cross-check and how
11
media bias responds to this, so we will make the problem as tractable as possible. In
particular, we let costs be zero and assume that readers only acquire information they
expect to use.
Assumption 1 Suppose σ∗ is an equilibrium strategy for p. Then there exists no strat-
egy σ′ such that Ep[u(yp(σ′), θ)] = Ep[u(yp(σ∗), θ)] and Ep[kp(σ′)] < Ep[kp(σ∗)].
The assumption simply says that if two strategies provide the same expected utility, the
reader never chooses the one with which he expects to acquire more reports. If costs
are strictly positive, this is of course always true. Suppose from now on that c = 0 and
Assumption 1 is satisfied. As before, let a1 ≤ a2. Lastly, to avoid tedious cases with a
large multiplicity of similar equilibria, suppose δ < 1/10. The analysis in this section
will apply to both the simultaneous and the sequential cases. In the next section where
we determine the equilibrium, we will distinguish between the two cases.
3.1. Optimal Actions
In this section we discuss the optimal action function. The details of its derivation
have been relegated to Appendix A. To build intuition, consider Figure II, which maps
posteriors in a particular case for each possible realization of the reports.
Since the optimal action is R when the posterior is greater than a half and L oth-
erwise, the thresholds (ψl, ψu, ϕ1, ϕ2) completely identify the optimal action function.
They are found by setting the relevant posteriors equal to a half and solving for p.
ϕn =
1
2
(1− an)(2− am)
1− an + anam , ψl =
1
2
(1− a1)(1− a2)
1 + a1a2
, ψu =
1
2
(2− a1)(2− a2)
2− a1 − a2 + a1a2 .
In the figure, whenever the reports disagree, the posterior is greater when outlet 1
reports R, and smaller when outlet 1 reports L. We show in the appendix that this is
true when outlet 1 is the most biased outlet, and is reversed when outlet 2 is the most
biased outlet. The intuition is that the most biased outlet is more informative, because
it sends a very strong signal when its reports goes against its bias. Therefore, whenever
the outlets disagree, the report of the most biased outlet is given more weight. Let ϕu
12
Figure II:
Posteriors. Drawn for a1 = 1/5 and a2 = 1/2.
0 1
1/2
1
p
ϕ1ϕ2 ψuψl
pip(R,R) pip(R,L) pip(L,R) pip(L,L)
(resp. ϕl) maximize (resp. minimize) ϕn with respect to n. Then the optimal action
function is given by
p < ψl : yp(r1, r2) = L for all r1, r2,
ψl < p < ϕl : yp(R,R) = R and yp(r1, r2) = L otherwise,
ϕl < p < ϕu : yp(r1, r2) = r1 if a1 < 1− a2 and yp(r1, r2) = r2 if a1 > 1− a2,
ϕu < p < ψu : yp(L,L) = L and yp(r1, r2) = R otherwise,
p > ψu : yp(r1, r2) = R for all r1, r2.
Cross-checkers effectively use the second report as a check on the first report in the
following manner. Suppose a reader satisfies ϕu < p < ψu. Notice that ϕu may be
less than a half, so the reader may not be a priori biased toward R. But, given the
reporting strategies, he is inclined toward R in the sense that he will choose action R if
at least one report recommends it. We can think of the optimal strategy in terms of this
“inclination”. If the first report confirms his inclination, the reader feels confident and
chooses R without reading the second report. On the other hand, if the first report goes
against his inclination, the reader is surprised and cross-checks. If the second report
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also goes against his inclination, this is a strong signal and he chooses L, whereas if
it confirms his inclination, he concludes that the first report was probably wrong and
chooses R.
The expected payoff for a cross-checker, Vp(a1, a2) ≡ Ep[u(yp(ρ1, ρ2), θ)], is derived
in Appendix A. Appendix B discusses optimal outlet types. In particular, whereas in
the benchmark case a reader always prefers an outlet which shares his bias, in the cross-
checking case he may prefer both outlets to be more biased than he is. Furthermore, he
may prefer that they are both biased in the same direction.
3.2. Optimal Acquisition
A reader will not acquire a report if he does not expect to follow its advice. We
can formalize this in the following way. Say that ρn ∈ σ if σt(h) = ρn for some h
and t. Let σ−n denote σ where ρn is replaced by ∅ if ρn ∈ σ. Furthermore, we write
yp(σ) = yp(σ
′) if yp(σ) and yp(σ′) generate the same outcome for all (x1, x2). It follows
from the definition of the optimal action strategy that
yp(σ) 6= yp(σ−n)⇔ Ep[u(yp(σ), θ)] > Ep[u(yp(σ−n), θ)]. (1)
This condition says that if the reader acts differently when we take information away
from him, it must be that this information is valuable. Suppose ρ1, ρ2 ∈ σ. We will say
outlet n’s report is influential if yp(σ) 6= yp(σ−n) and both reports are influential if this
holds for n = 1, 2. In other words, a report is influential if it can change the reader’s
optimal action. Suppose σ∗ is an equilibrium strategy for reader type p. Then (1) and
Assumption 1 imply that
ρn ∈ σ∗ ⇔ yp(σ∗) 6= yp(σ∗−n). (2)
Hence, if a report is acquired in equilibrium, then it must be influential. This is a useful
condition, since it allows us to focus on the action function. If none of the reports
are influential to a reader, he should remain uninformed. If only one of the reports
is influential, he should be a single-reader of that report, and if both are influential,
14
Figure III:
Equilibrium Acquisition Strategies
(a)
0 1ψl
don’t read
ϕl
cross-check
ϕu
single
ψu
cross-check don’t read
(b)
0 1ψl
don’t read
ψu
cross-check don’t read
Note: Figure IIIa shows outlet 1 being most biased; Figure IIIb shows the outlets being equally biased.
he should be a cross-checker. Let SU ≡ (δ, ψl) ∪ (ψu, 1 − δ), SS ≡ (ϕl, ϕu) and SC ≡
(ψl, ϕl) ∪ (ϕu, ψu). We can then prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Fix an equilibrium (a∗1, a
∗
2, σ
∗
p). Then types in SU are uninformed and
types in SC are cross-checkers. Types in SS are single-readers and for p ∈ SS,
ρ1 ∈ σ∗p if a1 < 1− a2,
ρ2 ∈ σ∗p if a1 > 1− a2.
If a1 = 1− a2, then SS is empty, and there are no single-readers.
Figure III gives an overview of the different reader types. Whenever the outlets are
equally biased (a1 = 1−a2), the reports provide exactly the same amount of information
(but with different bias) and therefore if one report is influential to a reader so are both
of them.11 In this case, if a reader acquires information, he always acquires both reports.
It should be clear from the discussion of the benchmark case why some readers
remain uninformed: they are sufficiently confident in their prior that no report is influ-
ential. The result that single-readers are moderate (or, at least, more moderate than the
most partisan cross-checkers) is in accordance with Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011). The
11. Effectively, when the outlets are equally biased, then pip(R,L) = pip(L,R) = p. Therefore, if one
outlet is influential, so is the other, since it can cancel the effect of the first outlet’s report.
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intuition is the following. Suppose as an example that a reader is very biased toward R.
This reader chooses L only if he observes a strong signal contradicting his prior. If both
outlets are moderately biased, then either report by itself does not provide him with a
very strong signal. But if both reports say L, this is very convincing to him. Therefore,
he benefits from cross-checking. A moderate reader, on the other hand, may find all the
information needed for his decision in a single report, as illustrated by Figure II.
4. MEDIA BIAS
In this section we analyze the market equilibrium, and in particular how the outlets
strategically choose their bias. Suppose that the assumptions in Section 3 are satisfied.
Notice that if an outlet chooses either an = 0 or an = 1, it is completely uninformative
(always sends the same report), and it follows directly from Assumption 1 that no reader
will ever acquire its report. Therefore, this will not occur in equilibrium, and to ease
the exposition we assume henceforth that 0 < an < 1, unless otherwise stated.
4.1. Simultaneous Case
In the simultaneous case, readers cannot condition their acquisition decisions on
the content of any of the reports. Hence, outlets know that whomever expects ex
ante to gain from cross-checking will acquire both reports. This is important, since it
implies that outlets are indifferent between getting their demand from cross-checkers
or single-readers. Contrast this with the sequential case, in which cross-checkers are
more fickle than single-readers, since they condition their stage 2 choice on what they
observe in stage 1. The fact that both types of readers are the same to outlets, makes
it straightforward to calculate demand, using the discussion of the previous section.
Suppose ψl, ψu ∈ [δ, 1 − δ] and a1 < a2 (recall that when a1 = a2 consumers choose
either report with equal probability, so outlets share total demand). Then the demand
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functions are given by
D1(a1, a2) =
{
ψu − ϕ1 + ϕ2 − ψl if a1 > 1− a2;
ψu − ψl if a1 ≤ 1− a2,
D2(a1, a2) =
{
ψu − ψl if a2 ≥ 1− a1;
ψu − ϕ2 + ϕ1 − ψl if a2 < 1− a1.
We refer to ψu − ψl as the active market. The key insight from the demand functions
is that cross-checking changes the incentives to compete at the center. In the single-
reading case, outlets would steal demand from each other by moving closer to the center.
When cross-checking is allowed, this motive is less clear. For instance, when outlets are
equally biased, demand-stealing is impossible since both outlets already have demand
from the entire active market. Therefore, competition at the center tends to be softer
when cross-checking is allowed.
We now analyze the equilibrium of the market. It turns out that this is not unique,
and in particular there is both a centrist equilibrium and a continuum of differentiated
equilibria, in which the outlets position themselves symmetrically around the center. In
the differentiated equilibria, outlets capture the entire market. The level of bias in the
differentiated equilibria depends monotonically on δ through the following threshold
a∗δ ≡
1
2− 4δ
(
1− 2δ −
√
1− 12δ + 20δ2
)
<
1
2
.
The inequality holds for δ < 1/10. The smaller a∗δ , the more outlets differentiate.
Furthermore, a∗δ is increasing with δ. Hence, the more disperse the reader beliefs (the
smaller δ is), the more outlets tend to differentiate.
Proposition 3 In the simultaneous case, A = AC ∪ AD, where AC is the centrist
equilibrium, AC = {(1/2, 1/2)}, and AD is a non-empty set of symmetric, differentiated
equilibria
AD = {(a, 1− a)}a∈A, A = (0, a∗δ ].
The intuition for the differentiated equilibria is the following. There are two effects at
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play. First, the most biased outlet always has demand from the entire active market,
whereas the least biased outlet does not have any single-reader demand. Therefore,
holding the active market constant, the least biased outlet gains from deviating to a
position that is at least as biased as the other outlet. Second, the least biased outlet can
increase the active market size by becoming more biased. The reason is that there is a
great deal of complementarity between the bias of the two reports. Most readers prefer
their news diet to be somewhat balanced,12 and therefore the least biased outlet can
always expand the active market by becoming equally biased to the other outlet. Thus,
the least biased outlet always gains from becoming more biased. As a consequence, if
one outlet moves away from the center, the other outlet will have an incentive to move
away too, but in the other direction. When the outlets are sufficiently differentiated,
they capture the entire market, and they are in equilibrium.
Given the multiplicity of equilibria, we would like to say something about selection.
There is no Pareto-dominant equilibrium, but as we next show, the equilibrium (a∗δ , 1−
a∗δ) has some prominence in that it maximizes reader welfare within the class of equilibria
that maximize profits. The corollary is a direct consequence of Proposition 6 below, and
the fact that in the differentiated equilibria outlets capture the entire market. Reader
welfare is measured as the total utility of readers.
Corollary 1 In the simultaneous case: (i) The equilibria in AD are profit-maximizing,
and (ii) the centralized equilibrium AC maximizes reader welfare in A. Furthermore,
within AD, the equilibrium (a∗δ , 1− a∗δ) maximizes reader welfare.
In light of this corollary, we choose to focus on the equilibrium (a∗δ , 1− a∗δ). The overall
welfare effect of moving from the benchmark case to simultaneous cross-checking is
ambiguous. Reader welfare is initially improved by the possibility of acquiring extra
information, but the news market also becomes more segregated, and we show later
that such segregation is detrimental to reader welfare. Take two extreme cases. First,
consider what happens when reader beliefs are very dispersed. As δ goes to zero, a∗δ
goes to zero as well and outlets become uninformative, since they (almost) always send
12. In the sense that the more biased toward R one outlet is, the more biased toward L they want
the other to be. We discuss this in Appendix B.
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the same report. As a consequence, reader welfare approaches the no-information level,
which is clearly worse than the benchmark case. Second, consider the situation in which
reader beliefs are very homogeneous. As δ goes to 1/10, then a∗δ goes to 1/2. In this case,
welfare is higher under cross-checking than in the benchmark, since outlet strategies are
the same in the two cases and readers benefit from the possibility of cross-checking.
Hence, simultaneous cross-checking may improve or diminish reader welfare compared
to the benchmark case, depending on the dispersion of beliefs.
4.2. Sequential Case
In the sequential case, the order in which cross-checkers acquire information matters.
Which report should be acquired first? Consider the case of ϕu < p < ψu. Readers
choose action R unless r1 = r2 = L. Therefore, if the first report says R, the reader
should choose R and not acquire the second report. If the first report says L, the reader
should acquire the second report and follow its advice. This leads to the same action
regardless of which report is acquired first, and thus the expected payoff is independent
of the order of acquisition. Instead we must use Assumption 1, which implies that
readers should choose the order of acquisition that minimizes the expected number of
acquired reports. This leads us to the following lemma.
Lemma 1 In the sequential case, cross-checkers choose their strategies as follows.
ϕu < p < ψu : σ
1
p(∅) = ρ1, σ2p(R) = ∅, σ2p(L) = ρ2,
ψl < p < ϕl : σ
1
p(∅) = ρ2, σ2p(L) = ∅, σ2p(R) = ρ1.
The lemma has the interpretation that readers first read the report that is closest to
their own bias, and then if they are “surprised” they acquire the second report. Since
we can precisely identify in which stage consumers acquire which report, we can split
demand into a well-defined stage 1 and stage 2 demand. Denote the stage t demand for
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outlet n by Dtn(a1, a2). If a1 < a2, then
D11(a1, a2) = ψu − ϕ1, D21(a1, a2) =
{
ϕ2 − ψl if a1 > 1− a2;
ϕ1 − ψl if a1 ≤ 1− a2,
D12(a1, a2) = ϕ1 − ψl, D22(a1, a2) =
{
ψu − ϕ1 if a2 ≥ 1− a1;
ψu − ϕ2 if a2 < 1− a1.
The difference to the simultaneous case is that now stage 2 demand is not certain.
Therefore, outlet n must weigh stage 2 demand by the probability that outlet m’s
report leads readers to cross-check. Lemma 1 implies that outlet 1 has positive demand
in stage 2 only if r2 = R and outlet 2 only if r1 = L. Denote the probability that
outlet n has positive stage 2 demand by Pn(am). Since outlets have uniform beliefs,
then P1(a2) = 1 − a2 and P2(a1) = a1. We can then write outlet n’s total demand in
the sequential case as
Dn(a1, a2) = D
1
n(a1, a2) + Pn(am)D
2
n(a1, a2).
In the simultaneous case, demand is exactly D1n(a1, a2) + D
2
n(a1, a2), so outlets are
indifferent between demand from different stages. In the sequential case, stage 1 demand
is more valuable than stage 2 demand, because it materializes with higher probability.
This creates an incentive to compete toward the center to steal stage 1 demand from
the other outlet, just as in the benchmark case. In equilibrium, this demand-stealing
incentive dominates, as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 4 In the sequential case the unique equilibrium is the centrist equilibrium.
I.e.,
A = {(1/2, 1/2)}.
When cross-checking is sequential the equilibrium is identical to the benchmark case.
We show in Section 5.1 that this is also the pair of strategies that maximizes total
demand, unlike in the benchmark and simultaneous cases, where total demand is maxi-
mized by choosing extreme positions. The reason is that in the sequential case, making
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one outlet more extreme diminishes the expected stage 2 demand for the other outlet.
Therefore, although the number of potential cross-checkers is maximized by choosing
extreme positions, the expected number of actual cross-checkers is maximized at the
center. Furthermore, the centrist equilibrium maximizes reader welfare.
Gentzkow and Shapiro (2011) show empirically that the level of segregation in the
American media market is greater among newspapers than online. This is consistent
with our results if we interpret the simultaneous case as characterizing a market in
which acquisition must be planned, such as the newspaper market, and the sequential
case as characterizing a market in which acquisition is flexible, such as the online market.
Arguably, our media market only captures a fraction of what goes on in a real media
market, but it does expose some mechanisms that are worth noting. First, when actions
are discrete, it is better to receive a strong signal sometimes than it is to receive a
weak signal all the time, since the weak signal may not contain enough information to
influence actions. This provides an incentive for outlets to be biased. Second, in the
benchmark case it is easier to steal demand from the other outlet, than it is to increase
the total market size. This provides an incentive for outlets to differentiate minimally.
Third, cross-checking weakens the second mechanism, since cross-checkers are not worth
“stealing”. The mode of cross-checking determines how much the demand-stealing effect
is weakened. The difference between the simultaneous and sequential case in our model
comes about from the third mechanism.
5. COMPETITION, WELFARE AND ADVERTISING
This section discusses the results of the previous section by (i) comparing the com-
petitive duopoly case to that of a single owner, (ii) analyzing welfare and the social
planner’s perspective, and (iii) allowing revenues to differ for single-readers and cross-
checkers.
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5.1. Monopoly and Joint Ownership
By monopoly we refer to the case of a single outlet and by joint ownership we refer
to the case of two outlets with a joint owner. We suppose that the joint owner chooses a
symmetric strategy, a1 = 1−a2 = a ≤ 1/2, in order to simplify the analysis. Since we are
interested in comparing outcomes with the cross-checking case, we analyze monopoly
and joint ownership in the case where c is small. In particular, we will assume that
c < δ2. In the cross-checking case, we use the assumptions of Sections 3 and 4.
Proposition 5 The unique monopoly equilibrium has a∗M = 1/2. Now assume a1 =
1 − a2 and let A¯ ≡ (δ −
√
δ2 − c, δ + √δ2 − c). Under joint ownership, we have the
following cases.
1. Benchmark: Suppose c < δ2. The set of equilibria is A = {(a, 1− a)}a∈A¯.
2. Sequential case: The unique equilibrium is A = {(1/2, 1/2)}.
3. Simultaneous case: The set of equilibria is A = {(a, 1− a)}a∈A.
Thus, the monopolist is always unbiased, whereas the joint ownership is at least as biased
as the competitive duopoly. In the sequential cross-checking case, the joint ownership
remains unbiased, since increasing the bias of one outlet creates a negative externality,
in the form of lower expected demand for the other outlet. In the benchmark case and
in the simultaneous cross-checking cases, there is no negative externality from increasing
bias, and therefore the joint ownership is as biased as possible.
5.2. Reader Welfare
As a measure of reader welfare we choose total reader utility. Unlike, for instance,
Mullainathan and Shleifer (2005) and Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), not all readers
will necessarily acquire a report in the present model. Therefore, a social planner who
wishes to maximize reader welfare must balance between maximizing the reader base
and maximizing the informational content of reports. The total utility when costs are
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zero is given by13
W (a1, a2) =
∑
n∈{1,2}
∫
SnC
Vp(a1, a2) dp+
∑
n∈{1,2}
∫
SnS
Vp(an) dp+
∫
SU
Vp dp,
where SnC is the set of cross-checkers who first read report n, SnS is the set of single-
readers of n, and SU is the set of uninformed consumers. As a benchmark, we use the
no-information level of welfare (no media), W0. Let WM , WJ and WD denote welfare
under monopoly, joint ownership and duopoly, respectively. Furthermore, let W∗ denote
the optimal welfare level. We summarize our findings as follows.
Proposition 6 In the benchmark case, as c→ 0 we have
W∗ > WM = WD > WJ
In the sequential cross-checking case,
W∗ = WJ = WD > WM .
In the simultaneous cross-checking case, there exists δ∗ > 0 such that
W∗ > WM > WJ = WD if δ < δ∗,
W∗ ≥ WJ = WD ≥ WM if δ ≥ δ∗.
When cross-checking is simultaneous, competition may lead to the worst possible out-
come, in particular when consumer beliefs are very dispersed. Therefore, monopoly may
actually be preferred. When cross-checking is sequential, the social optimum results both
under competition and joint ownership.
13. Notice that we have normalized the total utility by multiplying by 1− 2δ.
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5.3. Advertising
Several papers (Ambrus et al. (2012); Anderson et al. (2011); Gentzkow et al. (2012))
consider cross-checking and advertising. One of the key findings of these authors is that
in terms of advertising, cross-checkers are worth less to outlets than single-readers. The
reason is that outlets can only charge advertisers the marginal gain from accessing cross-
checkers, whereas single-readers can be charged at the monopoly price.
To analyze how this affects our model, we follow Gentzkow et al. (2012) and use a
simple reduced-form model of advertising. In particular, we normalize the value of a
cross-checker to one and let the value of a single-reader be given by γ > 1. We will just
look at the simultaneous case here. Whenever ψu, ψl ∈ [δ, 1− δ] and a1 < a2, profits are
as follows.
Π1(a1, a2) =

ψu − ϕ1 + ϕ2 − ψl if a1 > 1− a2;
ψu − ψl if a1 = 1− a2;
ψu − ϕ2 + ϕ1 − ψl + γ(ϕ2 − ϕ1) if a1 < 1− a2,
Π2(a1, a2) =

ψu − ϕ1 + ϕ2 − ψl + γ(ϕ1 − ϕ2) if a2 > 1− a1;
ψu − ψl if a2 = 1− a1;
ψu − ϕ2 + ϕ1 − ψl if a2 < 1− a1.
The greater γ is, the greater is the incentive to deviate for the least-biased outlet,
since this creates valuable single-reader demand. Therefore, when strategies are not
symmetric, the least-biased outlet has even more incentive to differentiate than before.
Hence, the set of equilibria must be a subset of the set of equilibria we obtained in
Section 4.1. Paradoxically, there is no differentiated equilibrium because outlets always
want to be even more differentiated, but when they become maximally differentiated
they are also uninformative. It seems reasonable that there are many situations in
which there exists some maximum level of bias which is still informative, so we make
the restriction a1, a2 ∈ [a¯, 1 − a¯], for some a¯ ∈ (0, a∗δ ]. We can then show the following
proposition.
Proposition 7 Suppose a1 and a2 are restricted to the interval [a¯, 1 − a¯] where a¯ ∈
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(0, a∗δ ]. Furthermore, suppose cross-checking is simultaneous and that advertising rev-
enues are differentiated such that demand is given as above. Then
A =
{
{(1/2, 1/2), (a¯, 1− a¯)} for γ ≤ 6/5,
{(a¯, 1− a¯)} for γ > 6/5.
The introduction of differentiated advertising revenues increases incentives to deviate
toward extreme positions, which may lead to the disappearance of the centrist equilib-
rium.
6. CONCLUSION
Cross-checking is an important aspect of nearly any media market. This paper has
sought to derive its implications for horizontal competition when readers are heteroge-
neous in their beliefs and actions, states and reports are binary. Casual intuition may
suggest that when readers can cross-check, outlets have more incentive to be moderate,
so as to appeal to the entire spectrum of the market. It has been demonstrated that this
is not so. On the contrary, cross-checking generates an incentive to be more partisan. In
equilibrium this incentive may be dominated by the intrinsic moderating forces of the
model, but as shown, differentiated equilibria are possible. Differentiation is detrimental
to reader welfare, which is maximized when outlets are centrist. From a social planner
perspective, competition seems to always be preferable to joint ownership, but monopoly
may outperform a differentiated equilibrium and so there is no monotone relationship
between competition and welfare.
Department of Economics, European University Institute.
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APPENDIX
A. DERIVING THE OPTIMAL ACTION STRATEGY
Since the action strategy is entirely determined by the posteriors, we first generalize
the intuition from Figure II. As in the main text, let a1 ≤ a2 such that outlet 1 is biased
toward R and outlet 2 is biased toward L. Observe that if r1 6= r2, and aR is the cut-off
of the report that says R and aL the cut-off of the report that says L, then the posterior
can be written as[
1 +
1− p
p
· α(aR, aL)
]−1
, where α(aR, aL) ≡ 1− aR
aL
· 2− aL
2− (1− aR) .
Hence, pip(R,L) > pip(L,R) if and only if α(a1, a2) < α(a2, a1). Rearranging we find
α(a1, a2)− α(a2, a1) = −2(a2 − a1)(1− a1 − a2)
a1a2(1 + a1)(1 + a2)
.
Therefore, pip(R,L) > pip(L,R) if and only if a1 < 1− a2. Combining this with the fact
that the posterior is greatest (resp. smallest) when both reports are R (resp. L) we
obtain the following set of inequalities.
pip(R,R) ≥ pip(L,R) ≥ pip(R,L) ≥ pip(L,L) if a1 ≥ 1− a2,
pip(R,R) ≥ pip(R,L) ≥ pip(L,R) ≥ pip(L,L) if a1 ≤ 1− a2.
(3)
When the reports disagree, the posterior follows the most biased outlet’s report, in the
sense that it is greater when the most biased outlet says R, and smaller when it says L.
The reason for this is that when there is disagreement, the strongest possible signal is
that the report of the most biased outlet goes against the bias. To see this, take the case
in which outlet 1 is most biased. Then a1 + a2 < 1, which we can interpret as saying
that the overall bias of the two outlets is toward R. This implies that L signals are
more informative than R signals, and therefore readers revise their posterior downward
when the reports disagree. When is this revision greatest? It is more informative
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when both outlets report against their bias, than when they both report according to
their bias. Hence, the posterior will move most in the former case, which implies that
pip(L,R) < pip(R,L). The posterior thus follows outlet 1’s report. When a1 + a2 > 1,
this is reversed. We then define the thresholds (ψl, ψu, ϕ1, ϕ2) implicitly by
piψl(R,R) = 1/2, piψu(L,L) = 1/2
piϕ1(L,R) = 1/2, piϕ2(R,L) = 1/2.
(4)
Since the posterior is strictly increasing in p, the thresholds are well-defined and will
allow us to identify a set of intervals as in Figure II. These intervals then determine the
action function. Solving the equations we find that
ϕn =
1
2
(1− an)(2− am)
1− an + anam ,
ψl =
1
2
(1− a1)(1− a2)
1 + a1a2
,
ψu =
1
2
(2− a1)(2− a2)
2− a1 − a2 + a1a2 .
From the ranking of the posteriors, we can deduce that ϕ1 < ϕ2 when outlet 1 is most
biased and vice versa when outlet 2 is most biased. Let ϕl (resp. ϕu) be the smallest
(resp. largest) ϕn with respect to n. Combining (3) and (4) and the fact that pip is
strictly increasing in p, we derive the action function yp(r1, r2).
p < ψl : yp(r1, r2) = L for all r1, r2,
ψl < p < ϕl : yp(R,R) = R and yp(r1, r2) = L otherwise,
ϕl < p < ϕu : yp(r1, r2) = r1 if a1 < 1− a2 and yp(r1, r2) = r2 if a1 > 1− a2,
ϕu < p < ψu : yp(L,L) = L and yp(r1, r2) = R otherwise,
p > ψu : yp(r1, r2) = R for all r1, r2.
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Lastly, we calculate the readers’ expected payoff, Vp(a1, a2) ≡ Ep[u(yp(ρ1, ρ2), θ)]. Using
the optimal action strategy, this becomes
Vp(a1, a2) =

p
(
1− a21
) (
1− a22
)
+ (1− p) (1− (1− a1)2(1− a2)2) if p ∈ [ψl, ϕl),
p
(
1− a21a22
)
+ (1− p) (2a1 − a21) (2a2 − a22) if p ∈ [ϕu, ψu),
max{Vp(a1), Vp(a2)} if p ∈ [ϕl, ϕu),
Vp otherwise.
Take the case where p ∈ [ϕu, ψu). Readers in this interval will only choose L if r1 =
r2 = L. The first term in the expected payoff is the probability that the reader chooses
the correct action when the state is R, which is equal to one less the probability that
both reports are L. The second term is the probability that the reader chooses correctly
when the state is L, which is equal to the probability that both reports are L. The case
where p ∈ [ϕu, ψu) is calculated similarly.
B. OPTIMAL OUTLETS
Recall that in the benchmark case, the optimal outlet type for a type-p reader was
given by a∗(p) = 1 − p. In the cross-checking case, the expression is a great deal more
complicated. Conditional on am, denote the an that maximizes expected payoffs by
a∗n(am, p). This can be found to be
a∗n(am, p) =
(1− p)(2− am)
(1− p)(2− am) + pam if yp(L,R) = R,
a∗n(am, p) =
(1− p)(1− am)
(1− p)(1− am) + p(1 + am) if yp(L,R) = L.
We can show that a∗n(·) is decreasing in am. Putting this in words, the more biased outlet
m is toward R, the more biased the optimal outlet n type is toward L. The intuition
is the following. Suppose yp(L,R) = R. In this case the reader will read the second
report only if the first report is equal to L. Suppose rm is read first and rn potentially
afterwards. The closer am is to zero, the greater will be the downward revision of beliefs
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after observing rm = L. This in turn leads to a larger upward revision of the preferred
outlet n type, since a higher type is associated with more bias toward L.
The preferred pair of outlets is then given by (a∗1, a
∗
2) such that a
∗
n = a
∗
n(a
∗
m, p).
Rather than analyzing this generally we look at an example. The pair of outlet types
that maximize the expected utility of a type-1/2 reader is either (1/3, 1/3) or (2/3, 2/3).
This contrasts with the benchmark case, where the optimal outlet type is given by
a∗(1/2) = 1/2. That is, in the benchmark the unbiased reader prefers an unbiased
outlet. Why, then, does he not prefer two unbiased outlets when he cross-checks? The
reason is that the reader has to pick an action when the reports disagree, and therefore
the “symmetry” of the problem is broken. Suppose the reader chooses two outlets both
with bias one half. If the reports disagree, the reader’s posterior is exactly one half, but
he must choose either L or R, although he does not feel very convinced about either
of them. The reports are not very helpful in this case. It would be better for him to
choose the outlets such that the reports either give a strong signal about R or a strong
signal about L. If, for instance, the reader chooses outlet types (1/3, 1/3), this provides
a strong signal for L whenever either of the reports says L, and a strong signal for R
whenever both reports say R. Thus, the reader obtains a strong signal no matter what
the outcome of the reports is.
This is in contrast with Krishna and Morgan (2001), who study sequential consul-
tation of experts and find that when two experts are biased in the same direction, it is
never optimal to consult both. We find that readers may prefer both experts (outlets) to
be biased in the same direction. There are two differences between our model and theirs.
First, in their model both experts observe the same information, hence it is possible to
learn everything necessary from the first expert. Second, in their model the decision
maker has to make a continuous decision, whereas in our model actions are binary.
C. PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose a1 < a2. The demand functions are D1(a1, a2) =
1
2
[a2 − c/(a1)] and D2(a1, a2) = 12 [1− a1 − c/(1− a2)]. Since D1(·) is increasing in
a1 and D2(·) is decreasing in a2, any equilibrium must be symmetric: a1 = a2 = a.
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In this case, readers acquire each report with equal probability, so outlets expect to
split demand. This is an equilibrium if and only if there is no discontinuity at a, i.e.
if lima1↑aD1(a1, a) = lima2↓aD2(a, a2). Otherwise, there exists a profitable deviation
around a. The condition is only satisfied for a = 1/2.
Proof of Proposition 2. First, suppose p ∈ SU . Then yp(r1, r2) = yp(rn) = yp(∅)
for all n and p. Therefore, the only way to satisfy (2) is by not acquiring any report,
i.e. Ep[kp(σ
∗
p)] = 0. For p ∈ SC , it follows from yp(·) that (2) is always satisfied for
n = 1, 2. Therefore, ρ1, ρ2 ∈ σ∗p and Ep[kp(σ∗p)] > 1. Lastly, suppose p ∈ SS. Take the
case where a1 < 1 − a2. Since yp(r1, r2) = r1 for all r1 and r2 and ρ1 6= ρ2, it follows
from the optimality of yp(·) that Ep[u(yp(ρ1), θ)] > Ep[u(yp(ρ2), θ)] ≥ Ep[u(yp(∅), θ)].
Therefore, ρ1 ∈ σ∗p. Furthermore, since Ep[u(yp(ρ1, ρ2), θ)] = Ep[u(yp(ρ1), θ)], then
ρ2 /∈ σ∗p. Similarly for a1 > 1− a2.
Proof of Proposition 3. Write the thresholds as ψu(a1, a2) and ψl(a1, a2) to make
explicit the dependence on cut-offs. First we calculate the following derivative.
∂(ψu(a1, a2)− ψl(a1, a2))
∂a1
=
1
2
[
1− a22
(1 + a1a2)2
− (2− a2)a2
(2− a1 − a2 + a1a2)2
]
. (5)
Case 1: Centrist equilibrium. We want to check if (1/2, 1/2) is an equilibrium.
Consider a deviation by outlet 1 to a1 < 1/2. Since δ < 1/10 by assumption and
ψl(1/2, 1/2) = 1 − ψu(1/2, 1/2) = 1/10, then ψl(1/2, 1/2), ψu(1/2, 1/2) ∈ (δ, 1 − δ).
Furthermore, both ψl(a1, 1/2) and ψu(a1, 1/2) are decreasing in a1. Hence, ψl(a1, 1/2) >
δ and therefore
D1(a1, 1/2) = min{ψu(a1, 1/2)− ψl(a1, 1/2), 1− δ − ψl(a1, 1/2)}.
Substituting a2 = 1/2 into (5) we obtain (15− 30a1)/(3− a1)3(2 + a1)2 > 0. Hence, the
first term in the minimum operator is increasing in a1. And since ψl(a1, 1/2) is strictly
decreasing in a1, the second term in the minimum operator is also strictly increasing
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in a1 for a1 < 1/2. It follows that D1(a1, 1/2) is strictly increasing for all a1 < 1/2.
Therefore, outlet 1 has no profitable downward deviation. Since the case is symmetric
for an upward deviation and for outlet 2, (a1, a2) = (1/2, 1/2) is an equilibrium.
Case 2: Differentiated equilibrium. The proof will demonstrate that if the outlets
are not in a centrist equilibrium, then they will seek extreme positions. We show this
in three steps.
Step 1. There is no differentiated equilibrium with ψu(a1, a2), ψl(a1, a2) ∈ (δ, 1− δ).
First take the case where a1 ≥ 1 − a2, a2 > 1/2 and ψu(a1, a2), ψl(a1, a2) ∈ (δ, 1 − δ).
First, rewrite the right-hand side of (5) to obtain
1
2
[
1− a22
(1 + a1a2)2
− (2− a2)a2
(2− a1 − a2 + a1a2)2
]
≤ 1
2
1− 2a2
(1 + a1a2)2
< 0. (6)
The first inequality holds because a1 + a2 ≥ 1 and the second because a2 > 1/2.
Then, the following inequalities hold since a1 ≥ 1 − a2, ψl(·) is decreasing in a1 and
ψl(a1, a2) ∈ (δ, 1− δ).
δ < ψl(a1, a2) ≤ ψl(1− a2, a2).
It follows from this and ψu(1−a2, a2) = 1−ψl(1−a2, a2) that ψu(1−a2, a2), ψl(1−a2, a2) ∈
(δ, 1 − δ). Therefore, by continuity of the thresholds, there exists a′1 < 1 − a2 with
ψu(a
′
1, a2), ψl(a
′
1, a2) ∈ (δ, 1− δ). Conditions (5) and (6) then imply
D1(a
′
1, a2) = ψu(a
′
1, a2)− ψl(a′1, a2) > ψu(a1, a2)− ψl(a1, a2) ≥ D1(a1, a2).
Therefore, a profitable deviation exists. If a2 > 1/2 and a1 < 1− a2 < 1/2, just relabel
the axis such that a˜n = 1− an, which gives a˜2 > 1− a˜1 and a˜1 > 1/2. Then repeat the
analysis to show that outlet 2 has a profitable deviation. If a2 < 1/2, then since a1 ≤ a2
we must have a1 < 1 − a2 and a1 < 1/2. We can then repeat the relabeling argument.
Hence, there can be no equilibrium with ψu(a1, a2), ψl(a1, a2) ∈ (δ, 1− δ).
Step 2. Consider now (a1, a2) such that exactly one of ψu(a1, a2), ψl(a1, a2) is outside
(δ, 1 − δ). This can only be true if a1 6= 1 − a2 (otherwise either both or neither of
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the thresholds are outside the interval). Suppose that δ < ψu(a1, a2) < 1 − δ but
ψl(a1, a2) ≤ δ. Checking the thresholds, we find that this implies a1 > 1 − a2. First,
take the case where ψl(a1, a2) < δ. Consider a small deviation a
′
1 < a1 such that
ψl(a
′
1, a2) < δ and ψu(a
′
1, a2) < 1− δ. Then
D1(a
′
1, a2)−D1(a1, a2) = [ψu(a′1, a2)− δ]− [ψu(a1, a2)− δ] > 0.
The inequality holds since the thresholds are decreasing in both arguments. Hence a
profitable deviation exists. Suppose then ψl(a1, a2) = δ. In this case, we can apply
the arguments of Step 1 to show that a profitable deviation exists. We can repeat the
arguments for ψu(a1, a2) ≥ 1− δ and ψl(a1, a2) > δ. Hence, there can be no equilibrium
with exactly one of the two thresholds outside (δ, 1− δ).
Step 3. Lastly, consider (a1, a2) such that ψu(a1, a2), ψl(a1, a2) /∈ (δ, 1 − δ). If a1 =
1 − a2, then both outlets have demand 1 and there is no profitable deviation. This is
clearly an equilibrium. Suppose instead that a1 < 1 − a2. Clearly D1(a1, a2) = 1, but
possibly D2(a1, a2) < 1, in which case outlet 2 has a profitable deviation to a
′
2 = 1− a1.
The inequality D2(a1, a2) < 1 holds true whenever there are single-readers, i.e. whenever
(ϕ1(a1, a2), ϕ2(a1, a2)) ∩ (δ, 1− δ) 6= ∅. (7)
Since a1 < 1 − a2 implies 1/2 < ϕ1(a1, a2) < ϕ2(a1, a2), then (7) corresponds to
ϕ1(a1, a2) < 1 − δ. As ϕ1(·) is decreasing in both arguments we have ϕ1(a1, a2) ≤
ϕ1(0, 1/2) = 3/4. Hence, if δ < 1/4, then D2(a1, a2) < 1 and a1 < 1− a2 cannot be an
equilibrium. Since δ < 1/10 by assumption, this is always true. The case of a2 > 1− a1
can be analyzed similarly. In conclusion, differentiated equilibria exist and are given by
a1 = 1− a2 and ψl, ψu /∈ (δ, 1− δ). It can be checked that this implies a1 ≤ aδ.
Proof of Lemma 1. The optimal action function implies that if ρ1, ρ2 ∈ σ, the
expected payoff Ep[u(yp(σ))] is the same no matter the order of acquisition. Then, by
Assumption 1, the order of acquisition should be chosen so as to minimize Ep[kp(σ)].
Suppose ϕu < p < ψu and suppose ρn is acquired in stage 1. If rn = R, then yp(R, rm) =
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R regardless of rm. Therefore, Assumption 1 tells us that the reader should not acquire
any report in stage 2. On the other hand, if rn = L, then yp(L, rm) = rm, and the reader
should acquire ρm in stage 2. It follows that the equilibrium strategy must be of the
type σ1p = ρn, σ
2
p(L) = ρm and σ
2
p(R) = ∅. Thus Ep[kp(σ)] = 1 +pa2n + (1−p)(2an−a2n).
This is the probability of acquiring ρn (which is one) plus the probability of acquiring ρm
(which is the probability that rn = L). Since Ep[kp(σ)] is increasing in an and a1 ≤ a2,
then the reader should acquire ρ1 first. A similar analysis shows that cross-checkers with
ψl < p < ϕl should acquire ρ2 first.
Proof of Proposition 4. We prove the proposition in four steps. Step 1 demonstrates
the existence of the centrist equilibrium. Step 2 shows that the only candidates for
differentiated equilibria are a1 = 1 − a2 and a1 = a2. Steps 3 and 4 rule out these
candidates whenever a2 6= 1/2, which leaves the centrist equilibrium as the unique
equilibrium.
Step 1. We first calculate the derivative of outlet 1’s demand when a1 < a2 ≤ 1/2.
∂D1(a1, a2)
∂a1
=a2
(2− a2)
2
[
1
(1− a1 − a1a2)2 −
1
(2− a1 − a2 + a1a2)2
]
+
1− a2
2
[
1− a22
(1 + a1a2)2
− a2(2− a2)
(1− a1 + a1a2)2
]
=
1
2
[
(1− a2)(1− a22)
(1 + a1a2)2
+
a22(2− a2)
(1− a1 + a1a2)2 −
a2(2− a2)
(2− a1 − a2 + a1a2)2
]
≥1
2
[
(1− a2)(1− a22)
(1 + a1a2)2
+
a22(2− a2)
(1 + a1a2)2
− a2(2− a2)
(2− a1 − a2 + a1a2)2
]
>
1
2
[
(1− a2)(1− a22)
(1 + a1a2)2
+
a22(2− a2)
(1 + a1a2)2
− a2(2− a2)
(1 + a1a2)2
]
(8)
=
1
2
1− 3a2 + 2a22
(1 + a1a2)2
(9)
≥0. (10)
The first lines should be obvious. The inequality in (8) follows from a1 + a2 < 1. The
equality in (9) follows from collecting terms and the inequality in (10) since a2 ≤ 1/2.
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This immediately implies that there is no profitable deviation from a1 = a2 = 1/2, since
upward and downward deviations can be treated symmetrically. Thus, a1 = a2 = 1/2
is an equilibrium. It also implies that no equilibrium can have a1 < a2 ≤ 1/2. Then,
by the symmetry of the problem, no equilibrium can have 1/2 ≤ a1 < a2. Hence, in the
next steps we can focus on potential equilibria of the type a1 = a2 and a1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ a2.
Step 2. We calculate the second derivative of outlet 1’s first and second stage demand
when a2 > a1 > 1− a2.
∂2D11(a1, a2)
(∂a1)2
=a2(2− 3a2 + a22)
[
1
(1− a1 + a1a2)3 −
1
(2− a1 − a2 + a1a2)3
]
> 0,
∂2D21(a1, a2)
(∂a1)2
=a2(1− a22)
[
1
(1− a2 + a1a2)3 −
1
(1 + a1a2)3
]
> 0.
Both derivatives are strictly positive since we have assumed that 0 < an < 1. This
implies that
∂2D1(a1, a2)
(∂a1)2
> 0.
The strict convexity of demand implies that there is no equilibrium with 1−a2 < a1 < a2.
Repeating the argument for outlet 2, there can be no equilibrium with 1−a1 > a2 > a1.
So the only possibilities are a1 = 1− a2 and a1 = a2.
Step 3. Suppose that a1 = 1− a2 6= 1/2. We show that this is not an equilibrium by
calculating the gain to outlet 1 from deviating to some a′1 close to a2. First, calculate
the demands. Since we have shown the convexity of the demand function when 1−a2 <
a′1 < a2, then either demand is decreasing over the interval, in which case there is no
profitable deviation, or the upper bound of the gain from a deviation is achieved by
letting a′1 approach a2 from below. We therefore calculate
D1(1− a2, a2) =1
2
2− a2
1 + a2 − a22
,
lim
a1↑a2
D1(a1, a2) =
1
2
2− 2a2 + 5a32 − 4a42 + a52
(1 + a22)(1− a2 + a22)(2− 2a2 + a22)
.
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Thus, there is a profitable deviation from a1 = 1− a2 if the following is positive.
lim
a1↑a2
D1(a1, a2)−D1(1− a2, a2) = − (1− a2)(1− 2a2)(a2 + (1− a2)
3)
(1 + a22)(1− a2 + a22)(2− 2a2 + a22)(1 + a2 − a22)
.
Notice that a1 = 1 − a2 6= 1/2 and a1 ≤ a2 imply a2 > 1/2. This again implies
that 1 − 2a2 < 0. All other terms are positive. Hence, the difference is positive, and
a1 = 1 − a2 6= 1/2 cannot be an equilibrium since there always exists a profitable
deviation close to a2.
Step 4. We show that a1 = a2 6= 1/2 is not an equilibrium. Outlets share demand
when a1 = a2, which implies that Dn(a, a) = (lima1↑aD1(a1, a) + lima2↓aD2(a, a2))/2.
This can only be an equilibrium if lima2↓aD2(a, a2) − lima1↑aD1(a1, a) = 0. Otherwise,
continuity implies that there is a profitable deviation. Calculate this difference when
a > 1/2.
lim
a2↓a
D2(a, a2)− lim
a1↑a
D1(a1, a) = −1
2
a2(1− a)2(1− 2a)
(1 + a2)(1− a+ a2)(2− 2a+ a2) > 0.
Hence, a profitable upward deviation exists. A similar calculation for a < 1/2 shows
that this is not an equilibrium either. Thus, a1 = a2 6= 1/2 can never be an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 5. In the monopoly case, cross-checking is clearly not possible
since there is only one outlet. Using the thresholds of Section 2.2 it is straightforward
to show that the equilibrium strategy of a monopolist is a∗M = 1/2. Consider now two
outlets under joint ownership.
Benchmark. If φ1u, φ
2
l ∈ [δ, 1− δ] then the demand of the joint ownership will be
DJ(a) = φ
1
u − φ2l = 1− a−
c
a
.
Maximizing this, we get a∗ =
√
c. Since we have assumed c < δ2, this implies that the
joint owner captures the entire market. In fact, since φ2l = 1− φ1u = a/2 + c/(2a), then
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for all a ∈ (δ−√δ2 − c, δ+√δ2 − c) ≡ A¯, the joint owner captures the entire market.14
Cross-Checking. Consider instead joint ownership. Suppose first that ψl, ψu ∈ [δ, 1−
δ]. In the sequential case, demand is given by DSEJ (a) = D
1
J(a) +aD
2
J(a). When outlets
are equally biased, all active readers cross-check, which implies that
D1J(a) = D
2
J(a) = ψu − ψl.
Whenever the outlets become more extreme (a lower), demand is higher in stage 1 and
potential demand is higher in stage 2. But also, the probability that stage 2 demand
materializes is lower. We can calculate the joint owner’s demand as
DSEJ (a) =
1 + a
1 + a− a2 .
This is maximized at a = 1/2, and hence the joint owner chooses cut-offs (1/2, 1/2), just
like the duopolists. Given δ < 1/10, then ψl, ψu ∈ [δ, 1−δ] and this is an equilibrium. On
the other hand, in the simultaneous case, demand is given by DSIJ (a) = D
1
J(a) +D
2
J(a).
It is straightforward to check that DSIJ (a) = 2 (i.e. everybody cross-checks) for any
a such that ψl ≤ δ and ψu ≥ 1 − δ. Hence, the joint owner will choose one of the
differentiated equilibria of Proposition 3.
Proof of Proposition 6. First, notice that W0 = δ
2 − 2δ + 3/4.
Benchmark case. Consider the social planner’s problem with two symmetric outlets,
i.e. a1 = 1− a2 = a and a ≤ 1/2. When costs are zero, we can then calculate welfare as
WS(a) = 2
[∫ 1−a
2
1/2
[
p
(
1− a2)+ (1− p) (2a− a2)] dp+ ∫ 1−δ
1−a
2
p dp
]
.
The derivative with respect to a is (3a2− 4a+ 1)/2 and the welfare optimizing strategy
in this case can be solved for a = 1/3. This yields W∗ = WS(1/3) = δ2 − 2δ + 89/108.
Hence, no form of competition delivers the social optimum. Monopoly and duopoly
14. Solve φl = a/2 + c/(2a) < δ for a to get A¯.
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yield the same welfare, since the duopolists both play the monopolist strategy. Hence,
WM = WD = WS(1/2) = δ
2 − 2δ + 13/16. In the joint ownership case, as c goes to zero
the equilibrium strategies go to (0, 1), which implies that WJ → W0.
Cross-Checking. Notice that the welfare function is the same in the sequential and
simultaneous cases. For a symmetric equilibrium, we can write it as follows.
WC(a) = 2
[∫ ψl
δ
Vp dp+
∫ 1/2
ψl
Vp(a, 1− a) dp
]
.
We can check that W ′C(a) > 0 for a < 1/2.
15 Hence, the social optimum is achieved
at a = 1/2. In the sequential case, the optimum is achieved by duopoly and joint
ownership, which yield welfare WJ = WD = WC(1/2) = δ
2 − 2δ + 17/20. Both are thus
preferred to monopoly. In the simultaneous case, both the competitive duopoly and
the joint owner have equilibrium strategies (a∗δ , 1− a∗δ).16 Since a∗δ is increasing in δ for
δ < 1/10, then WD and WJ are increasing in δ and go toward the social optimum (resp.
the no-information welfare) as beliefs become less (resp. more) disperse. Therefore,
there exists δ∗ < 1/10 such that the differentiated equilibrium is better than monopoly
when δ > δ∗ and worse otherwise. As δ → 1/10, the strategies of the competitive
duopolists as well as of the joint owner go toward (1/2, 1/2). Therefore, WJ ,WD → W∗.
Proof of Proposition 7. Consider the centrist equilibrium. Profits for both outlets
are ψu(1/2, 1/2) − ψl(1/2, 1/2), where we have augmented the notation to emphasize
the dependence of thresholds on strategies. If outlet 1 deviates to a1 < 1/2, it will have
15. In particular
W ′C(a) =
dψl
da
[V (ψl)− V (ψl, 1− ψl)] +
∫ 1/2
ψl
[U1(a, 1− a, p)− U2(a, 1− a, p)] dp
=
(1− 2a)(1 + a− 5a2 + 6a3 + 2a4 − 6a5 + 2a6)
4(1 + a− a2)3 .
This is positive for all a < 1/2 and zero for a = 1/2.
16. Recall that there are multiple equilibria, but we focus on this one in particular.
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profits ψu(a1, 1/2)−ψl(a1, 1/2)+(γ−1)[ϕu(a1, 1/2)−ϕl(a1, 1/2)]. Rearranging, we find
that outlet 1 has a profitable deviation whenever
γ > 1 + inf
a1<1/2
{
ψu(1/2, 1/2)− ψl(1/2, 1/2)− (ψu(a1, 1/2)− ψl(a1, 1/2))
ϕu(a1, 1/2)− ϕl(a1, 1/2))
}
.
The expression inside the infimum-operator reduces to 3/5 times (1 + a1)(2− a1)/((2 +
a1)(3−a1)), which is increasing in a1 and equal to 1/5 when evaluated at a1 = 0. Hence,
for γ > 6/5 there is no centrist equilibrium.
For strategies in AD, i.e. the set of differentiated equilibria, profits are 1 for both
outlets, but a deviation toward the extreme yields profits 1+(γ−1)(ϕu−ϕl) > 1.17 Out-
lets will therefore deviate toward (a¯, 1− a¯). Since at this point outlets can differentiate
no more, this is an equilibrium.
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